Fight ‘Em ‘Til We Can’t

Today the Montana Supreme Court affirmed Wrzesinski’s conviction for felony DUI. On appeal, the defendant argued that the trial court (First Judicial Dist. Ct., Hon. Dorothy McCarter, presiding) erred in denying Wrzesinski’s motion to dismiss by concluding that the State did not impede the defendant from getting an independent blood test. ¶10. The Court rejected this argument, holding that any request for an independent blood test must be “clearly stated and timely made” and that Wrzesinski’s mention of such a test had not met that requirement. ¶19. Further, the defendant had not proven that the arresting officer “unreasonably impeded” his right to the test. ¶23. Officers have no legal duty to ask defendants whether they want an independent blood test; so long as the officer reads the implied consent warning which advises defendants of their right to such a test, the officer has satisfied the law. ¶25.

Wrzesinski also argued that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress statements made during a routine traffic stop because the officer failed to give the defendant a Miranda warning. ¶27. The Court rejected this argument, as well, reasoning that the officer’s stop of Wrzesinski was not custodial, and therefore Wrzesinski was not entitled to the protections of Miranda. ¶34.

In my view, the most interesting part of this decision is the way it reaffirms the Court’s repudiation of the “free to leave” test for whether an interrogation is custodial. See U.S. v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544. The Court admitted that “Wrzesinski was not free to leave,” but explained that this stop still wasn’t custodial because “the facts demonstrate he was subjected to the routine process surrounding a traffic stop, noncustodial in nature, until he was placed under arrest.” ¶34. The Court relied on its reasoning in State v. Elison, 2000 MT 288, ¶33, which held that a person is not “in custody” when he/she is merely subjected to “the normal restraints that any motorist might expect to be subject to during a routine Terry stop.” The Court also relied on its holding in State v. Allen, 1998 MT 293, ¶13, where it held that a stop was not custodial where it was “public, routine, and temporary in nature.”

In short, Wrzesinski apparently reaffirms the Court’s position that police in Montana have wide latitude to detain citizens w/out advising them of their rights. Is it just me, or is this line of decisions ripe for appeal to a higher authority?